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MORE THAN JUST A TOOTHACHE? N.C. DENTAL
LEAVES MEDICAL BOARDS VULNERABLE: A
LOOK AT TELEMEDICINE COMPANIES AND
ANTITRUST CHALLENGES TO STATE
PRESCRIPTION DRUG RULES
ALEXANDER R. KALYNIUK
ABSTRACT
Encouraged by technological advancements and favorable provisions within the Affordable Care Act, telemedicine companies
that offer online doctor visits are thriving in the health care industry. Online doctor visits are a relatively new and cost-efficient
method to provide medical care over long distances that do not
require patients to step outside their homes. However, many state
medical board scope-of-practice rules prohibit physicians from prescribing medications without an in-person physical examination
of the patient, which impedes telemedicine companies from offering
their online services in those states. To circumvent this barrier,
telemedicine companies may have a prima facie case under § 1 of
the Sherman Act to strike down those professional regulations. After
the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in North Carolina State Board
of Dental Examiners v. FTC, state medical boards composed of a
majority of market participants likely do not enjoy Parker Immunity
from the Sherman Act under the state action doctrine because
they are active participants in the physician services market.
That decision, along with the lessons learned from the district
court proceedings in Teladoc v. Texas Medical Board, offers a
framework for telemedicine companies to explore future Sherman
Act challenges to restrictive state drug prescription rules.
Juris Doctor Candidate, William & Mary Law School Class of 2017. Bachelor of Arts in History of Science, Medicine, and Technology from the University of Wisconsin–Madison Class of 2014. The author would like to thank the
William & Mary Business Law Review Editorial Board, as well as guidance from
Shannon Ackenhausen of the Legal Council for Health Justice. The Author is
proud to follow in the path of his mother, Professor Anna Dusick M.D., by
contributing published researched for the benefit of the health care community.
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INTRODUCTION
In spring of 2015, UnitedHealthcare released a television commercial showcasing a couple dancing to the tune “(I’ve Had) The
Time of My Life” of Dirty Dancing1 fame.2 While trying to recreate the climatic dance scene when Johnny held Baby in the air,3
the couple topples to the ground, breaks a table, and injures themselves.4 As the commercial ends, the couple consults with a physician, not through a traditional office visit, but through an Internet
webcam.5 The commercial was an attempt by UnitedHealthcare
to entice consumers to try their virtual clinic services (also known as
online doctor visits).6 Advertising giant Leo Burnett claimed the
commercial was part of the “biggest direct-to-consumer advertising
campaign in the history of [UnitedHealthcare],” noting that the
health insurance company previously advertised to employers,
rather than consumers.7 In light of the Affordable Care Act (ACA)
and creation of health care exchanges, the goal of the commercial
was to advertise directly to consumers who did not have insurance through an employer.8 Importantly, that advertisement
DIRTY DANCING (Great American Films Ltd. P’ship 1987).
Our Song Commercial, UNITEDHEALTHCARE (March 15, 2015), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=v9YiTIYO-2A [https://perma.cc/H2TA-98X5] [hereinafter UNITEDHEALTHCARE COMMERCIAL]. UnitedHealthcare is one of the largest
health care companies in the United States. UnitedHealth Group, the parent
company of UnitedHealthcare, ranked number 6 on the 2016 Fortune 500 list and
is one of the most dominant industry players in the health insurance and
Managed Care sectors. UnitedHealth Group, FORTUNE (2016), http://beta.for
tune.com/fortune500/unitedhealth-group-6/ [https://perma.cc/4PVV-N7AY].
3 DIRTY DANCING, supra note 1.
4 UNITEDHEALTHCARE COMMERCIAL, supra note 2.
5 Id.
6 Id. Online doctor visits are an application of telemedicine, which is formally defined as the “use of medical information exchanged from one site to
another via electronic communications to improve a patient’s clinical health status.” What is Telemedicine, AM. TELEMEDICINE ASS’N, http://www.american
telemed.org/about-telemedicine/what-is-telemedicine#.Vgqxm4_BzGc [https://
perma.cc/7P2J-AU9L].
7 LEO BURNETT, How UnitedHealthcare “Came in Hot” With Its Biggest Consumer Ad Push, (Aug. 21, 2015), http://leoburnett.com/articles/work/how-united
healthcare-came-in-hot-with-its-biggest-consumer-ad-push/ [https://perma.cc/8J
UC-VNFU].
8 Id.
1
2
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demonstrates the relevancy of telemedicine9 in the contemporary
American health care system, and it implied that online doctor
visits are a desirable service for many consumers in a digital age.10
This Note contributes to the scarce legal literature concerning
telemedicine companies that provide online consultations between
patients and physicians.11 This includes companies such as Virtuwell, ConsultADoctor, Specialists On Call, LiveHealth Online, and
HealthTap, as well as industry leaders Teladoc and MDLive, whose
business models revolve around servicing online doctor visits.12
Those telemedicine companies typically contract with individuals, large companies, hospitals, or health insurers.13 Already,
two major health care insurers, Aetna and UnitedHealthcare, have
partnered with telemedicine companies to provide online physician
services for their members, which demonstrates that the health
care community is welcoming telemedicine with open arms.14
9 It is important to distinguish between the terms “telemedicine” and “telehealth,” as they are mistakenly used interchangeably. For the purposes of this
Note, “telemedicine” will refer to the actual delivery of remote clinical services, which mirrors the language of both the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) and the American Telemedicine Association (ATA).
See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., Telehealth: Glossary & Acronyms, http://www.hrsa.gov/healthit/toolbox/RuralHealthITtoolbox/Telehealth
/glossary.html [https://perma.cc/5S78-T4TF]; What is Telemedicine?, AM. TELEMEDICINE ASS’N, http://www.americantelemed.org/about-telemedicine/what-is
-telemedicine#.VgQURJNViko [https://perma.cc/7P2J-AU9L]. “Telehealth,” on
the other hand, is a broader term that covers more than clinical health care
delivery, and includes transmissions of health care information and educational programs such as WebMD. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., Telehealth: Glossary & Acronyms, http://www.hrsa.gov/healthit/toolbox
/RuralHealthITtoolbox/Telehealth/glossary.html [https://perma.cc/5S78-T4TF].
10 See UNITEDHEALTHCARE COMMERCIAL, supra note 2.
11 For convenience, this Note will use the broad term “telemedicine company” to refer only to private companies that service online doctor visits, even
though that term also encompasses companies that engage in other forms of
telemedicine such as remote patient monitoring.
12 See Online Doctor Consultation Services, VSEE, https://vsee.com/blog/on
line-doctor-consultation [https://perma.cc/5DU2-TUJQ] (describing payment plans
and consultation costs for major telemedicine companies) [hereinafter VSEE].
13 Id.; see also Olga Kharif, Telemedicine: Doctor Visits via Video Calls,
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Feb. 28, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014
-02-27/health-insurers-add-telemedicine-services-to-cut-costs [https://perma.cc
/H6T8-T7S4].
14 See Mary Delsener, Telemedicine & The Courts: Teladoc v. Texas Medical Board as a Case Study, B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 1 (2015).
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However, some state prescription drug rules act as barriers
that prohibit the increased use of online doctor visits.15 While
those conferencing services provide several advantages,16 some
state medical boards inhibit the further implementation of these
programs because their rules require a physician to perform an
in-person physical examination of a patient in order for the physician to prescribe medications.17 Medical boards justify these rules
as preserving the establishment of the patient-physician relationship, and for drug abuse and injury prevention purposes.18
Some state medical board rules are tailored to prevent “telemedicine abortions.”19 Other state rules, however, are broader
and attempt to prevent physicians from writing any prescription
without an in-person physical examination of the patient.20 While
the first category of rules may be unconstitutional as an undue
burden on a woman’s right to seek an abortion,21 the second
category of rules are a direct threat to telemedicine companies in
that they could very possibly limit the further expansion of
online medical services.22 State prescription rules are just one of
This Note discusses two of the most common types of state prescription
rules that negatively impede telemedicine: (1) “telemedicine abortion” rules
and (2) in-person physical examination requirement rules for prescriptions.
See infra Parts II.A–B.
16 Advantages of online doctor consultations include lower travel costs,
lower costs of physician visits, quicker access to medical care, and increased
output of physician services. See infra Parts I.A.1–4.
17 According to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), most states require
a physical examination as the basis for prescribing and dispensing prescription drugs. See CDC, PRESCRIPTION DRUG PHYSICAL EXAMINATION REQUIREMENTS 1–2 (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.cdc.gov/phlp/docs/pdpe-requirements
.pdf [https://perma.cc/GQ9G-H386] (listing state prescription drug rules as
enacted through December 4, 2013) [hereinafter CDC STUDY].
18 See infra notes 105–07 and accompanying text.
19 See Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc., v. Iowa Bd. of Med., 865
N.W.2d 252, 264, 268–69 (Iowa 2015) (holding an Iowa rule that forbade
medicated abortions without an in-person physical examination as unconstitutional because it placed an undue burden on a woman’s right to terminate
her pregnancy).
20 See CDC STUDY, supra note 17, at 2.
21 See supra note 19.
22 Aware of that threat, Teladoc, one of the largest telemedicine companies, was successful in enjoining the Texas Medical Board when they promulgated an anticompetitive rule that required a “face-to-face visit or in-person
15
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many roadblocks for telemedicine companies,23 yet telemedicine
companies may be able to challenge state medical board rules
requiring in-person examinations under federal antitrust law.
The 2015 Supreme Court decision in North Carolina State
Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC offers potential for future successful antitrust challenges to rules promulgated by state professional agencies.24 In N.C. Dental, a state dental board’s rule was
scrutinized under § 1 of the Sherman Act, because the Court rejected the argument that rules promulgated by the dental board
were protected under the antitrust state action doctrine.25
Around the same time as the N.C. Dental decision, a federal district
court in Texas enjoined the Texas Medical Board from promulgating
a rule that required a physician to conduct a face-to-face examination with the patient before prescribing controlled substances.26
The lessons learned from the Teladoc case, along with the holding in N.C. Dental, provide the basis for future antitrust lawsuits
challenging state medical board rules that require physicians to
conduct an in-person physical examination of the patient before
writing a prescription.27 This Note predicts that rules requiring
evaluation before a physician can issue a prescription.” Teladoc, Inc. v. Tex.
Med. Bd., 112 F. Supp. 3d 529, 534 (W.D. Tex. 2015). For an in-depth discussion of that case, see infra Part V.
23 See Brittney Bauerly, Telemedicine in Rural Communities: Navigating the
Legal Issues in this New Frontier of Health Care Delivery, NETWORK FOR PUB.
HEALTH L. (Dec. 8, 2015, 2:54 PM), https://www.networkforphl.org/the_network
_blog/2015/12/08/726/telemedicine_in_rural_communities_navigating_the_legal
_issues _in_this_new_frontier_of_health_care_delivery/?utm_source=Network
+Report+12-10-15&utm_campaign=Network+Report+12-10-15&utm _medium
=email&ut m_content=184 [https://perma.cc/XFR4-T3QA] (noting that problems facing telemedicine companies include reimbursement, professional
licensing, medical malpractice, data privacy, and FDA regulation concerns).
24 N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1108–11,
1114–17 (2015).
25 Id. First articulated in the 1943 Supreme Court case Parker v. Brown,
the state action doctrine provides state or local governments federal antitrust
immunity. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351, 359, 361–63, 367–68
(1942). Today, the state action doctrine is synonymous with the phrase “Parker
immunity.” See Jason Kornmehl, State Action on Appeal: Parker Immunity
and the Collateral Order Doctrine in Antitrust Litigation, 39 SEATTLE UNIV.
L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2015). For a complete discussion of the antitrust state action
doctrine, see infra Part IV.A.
26 Teladoc, 112 F. Supp. 3d at 543–44.
27 See N.C. Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1112–14; Teladoc, 112 F. Supp. 3d at 543–44.
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in-person physical examinations for prescriptions will not be
afforded Parker immunity28 under the state action doctrine if
the state medical board is not actively supervised by the state.
Thus, telemedicine companies may succeed in challenging those
rules under § 1 because those rules can be considered concerted
actions that unreasonably restrict telemedicine physicians from
participating in the physician services market within a certain
state. While state prescription rules vary from state to state,
antitrust challenges to state medical board regulations will likely
require a more detailed analysis than the per se framework.29
Instead, a court would likely apply the quick-look or rule of reason analysis.30 Under either the quick-look or rule of reason, a
state prescription rule would probably only survive if the state
medical board could advance the procompetitive justification of
decreased health care costs stemming from drug injury and
abuse prevention.31
This Note is organized to address the issues previously mentioned in turn. Section I offers a brief history and insight on the
relatively new business models of telemedicine companies that
offer online doctor visits, and how employers, health care providers, and associated industries are posed to benefit. Section II notes
the two most common types of state prescription drug rules that
hinder further expansion of online doctor services: “telemedicine
abortion” rules and in-person examination requirements. Section III describes § 1 of the Sherman Act and how it affects the
health care industry. Section IV looks at the § 1 tests used to
preempt state rules under the antitrust state action doctrine,
and discusses the impact of the 2015 Supreme Court case N.C.
Dental on Parker immunity and state medical boards. Section V
uses the framework of the Teladoc district court case and hypothesizes potential § 1 challenges to state prescription drug
rules that require in-person physical examinations.
Parker immunity grants a state actor immunity from federal antitrust
suits only if the actor (1) manifests a clearly articulated policy to displace
federal antitrust law; and (2) is actively supervised by public state officials.
See PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 1 ANTITRUST LAW 386 (4th ed.
2013). For more on Parker immunity, see infra Part IV.A.
29 See infra Part V.C.
30 See infra Parts V.D.–E.
31 See infra Parts V.D.–E.
28
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I. THE EVOLUTION AND EXPANSION OF TELEMEDICINE AND
ONLINE DOCTOR VISITS
Remote physician consultations, a precursor to online doctor
visits, began as early as the 1950s when health care providers
began to explore new ways to tackle the “access to care” issue in
rural areas.32 In 1959, a Nebraska hospital used a two-way television to transmit medical information, which prompted a few
other hospitals around the country to use similar technologies.33
However, most early telemedicine practices were not tremendously successful and interest dropped off in the mid-1980s, likely
due to high transmission costs.34 Yet, the Internet revolution in
the 1990s prompted interest in renewing remote physician consultations through online services.35
As recent as the early 2000s, independent telemedicine companies have sprung up across the United States.36 Telemedicine
companies that specifically provide online doctor visits arguably
began to incorporate in 2002.37 While it is hard to identify the “first”
telemedicine company, MyDoc may have been the first company
to provide online doctor consultations in 2002.38 However, MyDoc
quickly faced difficulties due to hostile state prescription rules
and had to discontinue their online services for several years.39
TELEMEDICINE: A GUIDE TO ASSESSING TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN HEALTH
CARE 36 (Marilyn J. Field ed., 1996), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK
45448/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK45448.pdf [https://perma.cc/KJS8-E4TA].
33 Id. at 36–38.
34 Id. at 40. The most interesting failure in early telecommunications doctor consulting may be the STARPHAC project—a collaborative effort between
the United States Indian Health Service, NASA, and the Lockheed Missiles and
Space Company—that aimed to provide medical services through satellite-based
communications to astronauts and rural Native American reservations. Id. at 39.
35 See Gunther Eysenbach, Towards the Millennium of Cybermedicine, J.
MED. INTERNET RES. (Sept. 19, 1999), http://www.jmir.org/1999/suppl1/e2 [https://
perma.cc/24SR-JPSA] (“The Internet and related new communication technologies enable health professionals to reach large populations with interactive
applications, which in turn opens enormous opportunities and challenges.”).
36 See Tyler Chin, Doctor-Founded Company a Phone-Only Practice, AMED
NEWS (May 23, 2005), http://www.amednews.com/article/20050523/business
/305239992/7/ [https://perma.cc/L9ZB-7N74].
37 Id.
38 See id.
39 See id. However, as of 2015, MyDoc offers online services again. See
MYDOC, https://www.my-doc.com/patients [https://perma.cc/4RNC-QDLY].
32
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In recent years, advancements in accessible, low-cost technology
have contributed to the recent success of online doctor services as
mobile technology such as smartphones, laptops, and tablets are
now readily available to many Americans.40 Recent studies demonstrate that 64 percent of Americans own smartphones. 41 From
that pool of smartphone owners, 62 percent have used their phone
to look up information about a health condition.42 Not surprisingly,
telemedicine company GlobalMed claims mobile technology allows
a patient to transmit vital sign information to their doctor, who can
respond and treat the patient appropriately.43 As more and more
Americans gain access to mobile technology, the greater the potential for companies that service products through that medium.
Today, online doctor visits provide several procompetitive marketplace advantages relevant to an antitrust industry analysis.
A. Procompetitive Advantages of Online Doctor Visits
Online doctor visits may be one of the most promising applications of telecommunication technology in the health care industry.44 These visits can take the form of a video conference
between the patient and the doctor, or they may involve no visual
contact between patient and physician at all.45 Decreased costs,
40 Studies show 90 percent of American adults own a cell phone and 42
percent own a tablet computer. PEW RES. CTR., MOBILE TECHNOLOGY FACT
SHEET (2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheets/mobile-technology-fact
-sheet/ [https://perma.cc/5Q89-7NPA].
41 PEW RES. CTR., U.S. SMARTPHONE USE IN 2015, at 2 (April 1, 2015), http://
www.pewinternet.org/files/2015/03/PI_Smartphones_0401151.pdf [https://perma
.cc/EC7Z-UTX5].
42 Id. at 5.
43 New Trends in Telehealth Technology, GLOBALMED, http://www.global
med.com/additional-resources/new-trends-in-telehealth-technology.php [https://
perma.cc/87WG-Q2ER].
44 See Bruce Japsen, With ACA, Telemedicine In ‘Perfect Storm’ for Coverage, FORBES (Dec. 9, 2014, 8:21 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/brucejapsen
/2014/12/09/with-aca-telemedicine-in-perfect-storm-for-coverage/ [https://perma
.cc/D7HY-KT55].
45 Technology, Media & Telecommunications Predictions, DELOITTE, at 20
(2014), http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Technol
ogy-Media-Telecommunications/gx-tmt-predictions-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc
/HE26-KQEQ] [hereinafter Technology, Media & Telecommunications Predictions]. While video conferencing may be the first application of virtual
doctor visits that comes to mind, Deloitte predicts that the vast majority of
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increased output, and increased quality of care are the hallmarks of a procompetitive business practice relevant to an antitrust analysis.46 Recent data suggests that online doctor visits
offer several procompetitive advantages—lower travel costs, lower
health care expenditures, quicker access to medical care, and
increased output of physician services.47 Those procompetitive
advantages are discussed in the following subsections.48
1. Lower Travel Costs
First, online doctor visits can greatly reduce the amount of
time patients spend traveling and reduces travel-associated costs.
Consulting with a physician from your mobile device or home
computer cuts down on the patient’s travel time to the physician’s office. A 2006 research study noted that the distance to
the physician’s office was directly proportional to the number of
office visits.49 It is axiomatic that eliminating the need to travel
to a doctor, especially for rural patients who live far from their
medical providers, reduces travel costs.
2. Lower Health Care Expenditures
Second, online doctor visits are less expensive than typical
in-person primary care visits. The cost of a single online doctor
virtual doctor visits in the future will involve no visual contact. The patient
would submit forms and photos documenting their medical condition and send it
via Internet to the physician, who would respond with a diagnosis or prescription. Id. However, twenty-five states currently prohibit a physician from
prescribing medications solely on electronic patient questionnaires. See CDC
STUDY, supra note 17, at 9–10.
46 See R. Preston McAfee, Hugo M. Mialon & Sue H. Mialon, Paper, Private Antitrust Litigation: Procompetitive or Anticompetitive?, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, ATR DIV., 1–2 (Dec. 1, 2005), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default
/files/atr/legacy/2006/12/27/220040.pdf [https://perma.cc/CN8A-YYJM] (“The
antitrust laws are intended to permit procompetitive actions by firms and
deter anticompetitive actions…. Competition lowers prices and increases firms’
incentives to innovate, to the benefit of consumers.”).
47 See infra Parts I.A.1–4.
48 See id.
49 W.T. Cecil, et al., Relationship of the Use and Costs of Physician Office
Visits and Prescription Drugs to Travel Distances and Increases in Member
Cost Share, 12 J. MANAGED CARE PHARM. 665, 673 (Oct. 2006), http://amcp
.org/data/jmcp/Cecil%20article.pdf [https://perma.cc/7RBG-YLRH].
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visit typically costs a patient between $40 to $50.50 A typical inperson primary care visit, on the other hand, costs uninsured patients $150 on average and privately insured patients around $49.51
Moreover, some private health insurers such as UnitedHealthcare
and Anthem cover all the costs of online doctor visits provided
by select telemedicine companies.52 Thus, patients enrolled in
certain private insurance plans pay no out-of-pocket costs for
online doctor visits.53
3. Quicker Access to Medical Care
Third, telemedicine companies make an effort to promote how
quick it is to access a doctor through their online consultation
services.54 Industry leader, Teladoc, claims that physician response time was less than ten minutes on average.55 In other words,
on average it takes less than ten minutes to contact and set up
an immediate appointment with a physician using Teladoc’s services.56 Moreover, online clinics are typically open twenty-four
hours, seven days a week.57 In-person visits, on the other hand,
may take days to weeks to occur after the patient calls to request an appointment.58 Wait times for in-person doctor visits
See VSEE, supra note 12.
See Primary care visits available to most uninsured but at a high price,
JOHNS HOPKINS BLOOMBERG SCHOOL OF PUB. HEALTH (May 5, 2015), http://
www.jhsph.edu/news/news-releases/2015/primary-care-visits-available-to-most
-uninsured-but-at-a-high-price.html [https://perma.cc/64XD-9SRH].
52 Abby Goodnough, Modern Doctors’ House Calls: Skype Chat and Fast
Diagnosis, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/12 /health
/modern-doctors-house-calls-skype-chat-and-fast-diagnosis.html?_r=0 [https://
perma.cc/UK27-55BJ].
53 See id.
54 See VSEE, supra note 12 (listing various telemedicine companies and
their response times to patient requests for an online visit).
55 How does it work?, TELADOC, http://www.teladoc.com/how-does-it-work/
[https://perma.cc/5PN5-98BP].
56 See id.
57 Telemedicine companies Virtuwell, ConsultADoctor, Specialists On Call,
LiveHealth Online, HealthTap, MDLive, and Teladoc all claim to provide 24/7
access to doctors through their online consulting services. See VSEE, supra
note 12.
58 Physician Appointment Wait Times and Medicaid and Medicare Acceptance Rates, MERRITT HAWKINS (2014), http://www.merritthawkins.com/up
loadedFilesMerrittHawkings/Surveys/mha2014waitsurvPDF.pdf [https://perma
50
51
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vary wildly according to location in the United States. According
to a 2014 survey, it may take only five days to schedule and see
a doctor in Dallas, Texas, but up to sixty-six days in Boston,
Massachusetts.59 One study demonstrated that online doctor
visits resulted in quicker visits and, consequently, less follow-up
visits, thereby reducing health care costs.60
4. Increased Output of Physician Services
Fourth, physicians are able to consult more patients by using
online consulting technologies. Sources are scarce to support
that notion, however one telemedicine company successfully
introduced evidence to support that fact in a recent antitrust
case.61 In that case, physicians testified that online consultations allowed them to treat more patients and practice medicine
on a more flexible schedule.62 While that testimony derived from
affidavits,63 it is conceivable that a study of publishable quality
could come to the same conclusion and offer more light on this
procompetitive advantage.
B. Potential Business Impact on Other Industries
In the last two decades, health care and social assistance has replaced the manufacturing industry as the single most dominant
industry in the vast majority of states.64 While other industries
were hit hard by the 2008 recession, the health care sector has
.cc/DCP6-3N3A] (providing the average scheduling times for in-person doctor
visits in different cities of the United States).
59 Id.
60 Lori Uscher-Pines & Ateev Mehrotra, Analysis of Teladoc use seems to
indicate expanded access to care for patients without prior connection to a provider, 33 HEALTH AFFAIRS 258, 258 (Feb. 2014), http://content.healthaffairs
.org/content/33/2/258 [https://perma.cc/4ABB-328G].
61 See Teladoc, Inc. v. Tex. Med. Bd., 112 F. Supp. 3d 529, 537 (W.D. Tex. 2015).
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, LARGEST INDUSTRIES BY STATE, 1990–2013
(July 28, 2014), http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2014/ted_20140728.htm [https://
perma.cc/895L-2QJK]; see also Joshua Wright, Health care’s unrivaled job gains
and where it matters most, FORBES (Oct. 13, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites
/emsi/2013/10/07/health-cares-unrivaled-job-gains-and-where-it-matters-most
/#57f1a93b14a7 [https://perma.cc/7R39-LEDT].
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largely been resilient.65 In the near future, online doctor visits
may become the preferred and easiest way to reach your doctor.66
Employers, health care companies, and associated industries may
all benefit from the success of telemedicine companies.
1. Employers
Some of our country’s largest non-healthcare employers, such
as PepsiCo and Bank of America, offer online doctor visits to
their employees in order to cut health care costs and make physicians more accessible.67 A 2015 survey based on responses from
large American companies illuminated that this trend is likely
to continue because around 74 percent of respondents planned to
offer telehealth to employees in states where it is legal.68
The final phase of the Affordable Care Act’s Employer Shared
Responsibility Mandate (“employer mandate”)69 may further encourage large employers to use online doctor visits. As of 2016,
the employer mandate applies to employers with fifty or more
full-time employees or full-time equivalents (FTEs), and requires those companies to offer affordable health insurance at a
minimum value to their full-time employees or FTEs and their
children up to the age of 26.70 If an applicable company fails to
See Wright, supra note 64.
Eric Topol, The future of medicine is in your smartphone, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 9,
2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-future-of-medicine-is-in-your-smartphone
-1420828632 [https://perma.cc/A9UF-WY2H] (noting that consulting firms Deloitte
and PricewaterhouseCoopers forecasted “that virtual physician visits (replacing in-office visits) will soon become the norm”).
67 See Jayne O’Donnell & Benjamin Mitchell, Big telehealth firm to go public
as remote doctor visits gain traction, USA TODAY (June 30, 2015), http://www
.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2015/06/30/telehealth-ipo-teladoc-healthcare
-costs/29482557/ [https://perma.cc/J7PB-B5HL] (stating that PepsiCo and Bank
of America offer online doctor visits provided by Teladoc to their approximately
11 million employees).
68 Health care benefits cost increases to hold steady in 2016, National Business Group on Health Survey Finds, NAT’L BUS. GROUP ON HEALTH (Aug. 12,
2015), https://www.businessgrouphealth.org/pressroom/pressRelease.cfm?ID=
263 [https:// perma.cc/B85W-4T3R].
69 26 U.S.C. § 4980H.
70 See id.; Employer Mandate Fact Sheet, CIGNA (May 2015), http://www
.cigna.com/assets/docs/about-cigna/informed-on-reform/employer-mandate-fact
-sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/DT4B-NTQE].
65
66
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comply, the IRS will issue a penalty to them.71 In other words,
employers with fifty or more employees are required to provide affordable health insurance at a minimum value to their employees
and their children or face a fine. This could provide a major incentive for more companies to utilize health plans that honor online
doctor visits, or include them in their own group plans, because
they are a cheaper method of health care administration than inperson visits.72
2. Health Care Providers
Health care executives view telemedicine as an important
component for the future of their companies.73 The ACA’s reimbursement guidelines may be one of the major factors in expanding telemedicine policies, as many hospitals are switching from
their prior fee-for-service model to a pay-for-performance reimbursement model.74 The pay-for-performance model reimburses
federal health care funds according to (1) how well the health
care provider performs in relation to other hospitals and (2) how
much the provider improved their own performance.75 Thus, health
care companies bare a greater risk for keeping patients healthy,
26 U.S.C. § 4980H(c)(4)(A). The penalty is calculated according to the
gravity of the company’s failure to provide affordable health insurance at a
minimum value. See id. In other words, if more of a certain company’s employees go elsewhere for coverage, or have to pay more than what is determined to be “affordable,” then the penalty will be larger (but still subject to a
maximum amount). See Penalties for employers not offering coverage under
the Affordable Care Act during 2016, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Oct. 2,
2015), http://kff.org/infographic/employer-responsibility-under-the-affordable
-care-act/ [https://perma.cc/CMV5-ZY36].
72 See supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text.
73 A recent study found that 90 percent of health care executives have either
begun to develop or implement a telemedicine program. FOLEY & LARDNER LLP,
2014 TELEMEDICINE SURVEY 1 (Nov. 11, 2014), http://www.foley.com/files/Pub
lication/0585f5b1-1205-4be7-be5a-4e14602a4fac/Presentation/PublicationAttach
ment/39c25a9b-5ff1-4ee8-b861-4ea2d71718ae/2014%20Telemedicine%20Survey
%20Executive%20Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/M4KT-EQL8] [hereinafter
FOLEY & LARDNER SURVEY].
74 Id. at 2.
75 Linking quality to payment, MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov
/hospitalcompare/linking-quality-to-payment.html [https://perma.cc/W3R5
-Z86D]. Changes to the health care reimbursement laws are generally found
in Title III of the ACA. 124 Stat. 119.
71
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and need to capitalize on innovative health care techniques such
as video conferencing and other telemedicine practices.76 To sum
up recent activity in the health care industry, Chief Executive
Officer of telemedicine company MDLive, Randy Parker, observed
that the ACA created “a perfect storm .... We are at a point where
both technology and payers who are providing reimbursement
have accepted the fact that there is an inflection point.”77
3. Associated Industries
Companies outside the health care industry are predicted to
profit from telemedicine. At least one major technology company
is testing the waters to join the health care industry because of
the lucrative possibilities of telemedicine.78 In 2014, tech giant
Google experimented with a trial telemedicine service.79 Consulting firm Deloitte predicted that the technology and telecommunications industries will profit in their response to the
“growing demand for data volumes, quality of service data, high
speed broadband ... and wireless networks.”80 Technology device
manufacturers are also likely to benefit in expanding markets for
mobile devices and mobile applications.81 With these predictions
in mind, online doctor companies and associated industries may
have a very profitable future. However, there are several potential roadblocks including reimbursement, professional licensing,
medical malpractice, data privacy, U.S. Food and Drug Administration regulations, and fraud concerns.82 This Note does not
discuss those hurdles; instead, it focuses on state prescription
drug rules that prohibit prescriptions without an in-person visit.
See FOLEY & LARDNER SURVEY, supra note 73, at 2.
See Japsen, supra note 44.
78 Amit Chowdhry, Google is testing a “Talk With a Doctor” feature within
medical search results, FORBES (Oct. 15, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites
/amitchowdhry/2014/10/15/google-is-testing-a-talk-with-a-doctor-feature-within
-medical-search-results/ [http://perma.cc/ALF6-ZDYB].
79 Id. Google users have the option to set up a video chat session with a
doctor if they searched for certain medical symptoms on the Google search
engine. Id.
80 See Technology, Media & Telecommunications Predictions, supra note 45.
81 See id.
82 See Bauerly, supra note 23.
76
77
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II. STATE PRESCRIPTION DRUG RULE BARRIERS TO
ONLINE DOCTOR VISITS
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approves drugs
marketed for prescription use.83 However state laws and rules—
not federal law—usually dictate the physical examination requirements for medication prescriptions.84 While FDA imposes
labeling requirements on drugs,85 the agency cannot regulate
the practice of medicine. Instead, states fill the void of regulating the practice of medicine and impose rules on prescribers.86
Pursuant to a state’s police power,87 state legislatures generally create medical boards to regulate the practice of medicine.88
The state legislature dictates who is eligible to serve as a board
member; physicians typically dominate the composition of the
board, but some laypersons also serve as members.89 Through rules,
medical boards generally regulate licensure, disciplinary procedures, and scope-of-practice.90 Scope-of-practice regulations aim to
define the “spheres of activity within which various types of
health-care providers ... are authorized to practice.”91 It follows
83 See 21 U.S.C. § 353(b) (codifying the Durham-Humphrey Amendment
and requiring a prescription for drugs that are not safe for self-medication
(i.e., over-the-counter) purposes).
84 See CDC STUDY, supra note 17, at 1 (“States have the primary responsibility to regulate and enforce prescription drug practice.”).
85 See 21 C.F.R. § 201.56 (defining the content and formatting requirements
of prescription drug labels).
86 See CDC STUDY, supra note 17, at 1.
87 The police power allows a state legislature to enact or delegate to another
administrative body “reasonable regulations established directly by legislative
enactment as will protect the public health and the public safety.” Jacobson v.
Mass., 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905).
88 Nadia N. Sawicki, Character, Competence, and the Principles of Medical
Discipline, 13 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 285, 289 (2010). Some state medical
boards are independent bodies, while others are part of a larger administration,
such as a department of health. See Frequently Asked Questions About State
Medical Boards, FED’N OF ST. MED. BDS., http://www.fsmb.org/policy/consumer
-resources/frequent-questions [https://perma.cc/TX4G-PMDN].
89 See Sawicki, supra note 88, at 291–92; BARRY R. FURROW, HEALTH LAW:
CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 87 (7th ed. 2013).
90 Sawicki, supra note 88, at 290.
91 Barbara J. Safriet, Closing the Gap Between Can and May in HealthCare Providers’ Scopes of Practice: A Primer for Policymakers, 19 YALE J.
REG. 301, 302 (2002).
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that regulations that define the circumstances and conditions
that a physician must adhere to in order to prescribe prescription
drugs are considered scope-of-practice regulations. The importance
of state prescription drug rules as a scope-of-practice regulation
comes into play later in this Note in the sections that cover the
antitrust analysis and potential challenges to those rules.92
State rules that forbid medication prescriptions without an
in-person physical examination of the patient prevent telemedicine companies from providing medication prescriptions through
their online visits.93 The following sections, A and B, discuss the
two most common types of rules that prevent telemedicine companies from prescribing medications through their online services.
A. “Telemedicine Abortion” Rules
Restricting access to “telemedicine abortions” may be a proximate cause behind some restrictive prescription rules. The term
“telemedicine abortion” refers to a medicated abortion capable of
being induced within your own home, without ever consulting a
gynecologist in-person.94 The first stage involves an in-person
visit with a nurse who administers an ultrasound test and lab
work with the woman seeking an abortion.95 Afterwards, the
woman conducts a video conference with a gynecologist to determine if a medicated abortion is a proper option.96 If so, the
gynecologist prescribes mifepristone and misoprostol, two prescription drugs that cause the lining of the uterus to break down
and empty, effectively inducing a medicated abortion without the
woman entering a surgical room or an in-person meeting with a
See infra Parts IV–V.
For example, a Texas rule previously required a physician to conduct a
“face-to-face” physical examination in order for them to prescribe prescription
drugs. 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 190.8(L) (2015). Telemedicine company, Teladoc,
filed an antitrust suit against the administrative agency and a federal court
granted an injunction against enforcement of that rule. See Teladoc, Inc. v.
Tex. Med. Bd., 112 F. Supp. 3d 529 (W.D. Tex. 2015).
94 See Alana Semuels, The Safer, More Affordable Abortion Only Available
in Two States, ATLANTIC (Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/business
/archive/2014/10/the-safer-more-affordable-abortion-only-available-in-two-states
/381321/ [https://perma.cc/4JUH-TUY6].
95 Id.
96 Id.
92
93
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physician.97 As many as eighteen states have placed restrictions
on telemedicine abortions,98 and require a physician to perform an
in-person physical examination of the woman.99 State rules that
effectively eliminate telemedicine abortions may simply limit medication administration unless the physician is present at the time.100
While there is little empirical evidence as to the outcomes of
telemedicine abortions due to stringent state laws and regulations,101 researchers studied telemedicine abortions in Iowa and
concluded that these forms of abortions improved access to abortions for women living in remote areas and reduced second-trimester abortions.102 Rules and laws that strictly target telemedicine
abortions may be viewed as unconstitutional under the abortion
doctrine’s “undue burden” analysis,103 therefore an antitrust suit
may not be the proper remedy. However, telemedicine abortion
rules are worth noting as an example of one common state prescription rule that impedes online doctor services.
B. In-Person Examination Requirements
Some state medical boards place blanket bans on all forms of
medication prescriptions without an in-person physical examination
See The Abortion Pill, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, http://www.plannedparent
hood.org/learn/abortion/the-abortion-pill [https://perma.cc/23M9-GE9R].
98 See Semuels, supra note 94.
99 See GUTTMACHER INST., MEDICATION ABORTION (Feb. 1, 2016), http://www
.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_MA.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZER3-JYG5]
(noting that, in eighteen states, the “clinician providing a medication abortion
[must] be physically present during the procedure, thereby prohibiting the use
of telemedicine to prescribe medication for abortion remotely.”).
100 See, e.g., IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 653-13.10(3) (2016), invalidated by Planned
Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc. v. Iowa Bd. of Med., 865 N.W.2d 252 (Iowa
2015) (requiring a physician to be physically present with the woman at the
time the abortion-inducing drug is provided).
101 See Semuels, supra note 94 (noting that fifteen states have banned telemedicine abortions).
102 See Daniel Grossman et al., Changes in service delivery patterns after
introduction of telemedicine provision of medical abortion in Iowa, 103 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 73 (2013).
103 See Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, 865 N.W.2d at 269 (holding
the Iowa rule forbidding medicated abortions without an in-person physician
present as unconstitutional because it placed an undue burden on a woman’s
right to terminate her pregnancy).
97
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of the patient.104 Proponents of these rules argue that forbidding
online consultations that result in medication prescriptions is
aimed at establishing and preserving a physician-patient relationship.105 That relationship has origins in contract law, but
also involves fiduciary obligations on behalf of the physician.106
Injury and prescription drug abuse prevention is the more compelling argument behind rules that require an in-person physical
examination.107 However, the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention—the federal agency charged with public health research—has noted that little identifiable information is available
on the effectiveness of those statutes in preventing injury and
drug abuse.108
As of 2015, thirty-four states and the District of Columbia require a “physical examination” for prescribing a controlled substance.109 Some states will explicitly state that a patient-physician
relationship is required.110 Indiana, for example, requires that “a
physician shall not prescribe, dispense, or otherwise provide, or
cause to be provided, any controlled substance to a person who
the physician has never personally physically examined and
diagnosed.”111
Other states will reference the establishment of a patientphysician relationship that, as defined by state law, must include a
physical examination.112 For example, South Carolina requires a
“proper physician-patient relationship.”113 That relationship requires the physician to, “at a minimum ... personally perform and
document an appropriate history and physical examination.”114

See CDC STUDY, supra note 17.
Twenty-three states and the District of Columbia have laws requiring a
physical examination of the patient related to the creation of a physician-pa
-tient relationship. See CDC STUDY, supra note 17, at 6 n.35.
106 FURROW, supra note 89, at 188 n.3.
107 See CDC STUDY, supra note 17, at 1.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 2 n.10.
110 Id. at 2.
111 844 IND. ADMIN. CODE 5-4-1 (2003).
112 CDC STUDY, supra note 17, at 6–7.
113 S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-47-113(A) (2015).
114 Id. § 40-47-113(A)(1) (2015).
104
105
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It is possible that broad rules that forbid prescriptions without in-person contact by the physician will be deemed as anticompetitive under § 1 of the Sherman Act if challenged by the
appropriate telemedicine company, the FTC, or even a consumer.115
III. THE SHERMAN ACT AND THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits “[e]very contract,
combination, ... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States.”116 Taken literally, nearly every agreement between two or more parties can be considered a “restraint
of trade;” thus the Supreme Court has limited the restrictions
contained in § 1 to bar only “unreasonable restraints of trade.” 117
Yet, the Sherman Act is treated as a common law statute and
the definition of an “unreasonable restraint of trade” evolves
with economic theory and contemporary market conditions.118
The Supreme Court interpreted the Sherman Act as a congressional effort to eliminate the “three evils” (“anticompetitive
effects”) commonly produced by monopolies: (1) increased prices;
(2) reduced output or a limitation on production; and (3) reduced
quality.119 Plaintiffs can prove a prima facie case under § 1 by
alleging that either (1) the defendant possesses market power;120
or (2) the anticompetitive agreement creates at least one of the
three anticompetitive effects.121 Moreover, the plaintiff’s claim
See infra Part V.A.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2015).
117 NCAA v. Bd. Regents Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984).
118 See Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 888
(2007) (“Yet the Sherman Act’s use of ‘restraint of trade’ ‘invokes the common
law itself, ... not merely the static content that the common law had assigned
to the term in 1890.’”) (citing Bus. Elec. Corp. v. Sharp. Elec. Corp., 485 U.S.
717, 732 (1988)). Stare decisis is less influential in Sherman Act cases because the interpretation of the statute evolves to meet modern understandings and experiences, similar to the way the common law changes through
time. See id.
119 Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 52 (1911).
120 See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 27 n.46
(1984) (“As an economic matter, market power exists whenever prices can be
raised above the levels that would be charged in a competitive market.”).
121 See United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668 (1993) (“The plaintiff
may satisfy this burden by proving the existence of actual anticompetitive
115
116
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for relief is subject to a higher pleading standard and must be
“plausible on its face” and require “more than a sheer possibility”
that the defendant acted unlawfully.122
The health care industry is not exempt from § 1. The Sherman
Act was intended “to embrace the widest array of conduct possible.”123 The Supreme Court found that restrictions on physician
services have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, and
are thus subject to the restrictions of the Sherman Act.124 The
Supreme Court made clear that it “refuse[s] to tolerate manifestly
anticompetitive conduct simply because the health care industry
is involved.”125
When an anticompetitive agreement or concerted action126 is
challenged under § 1, courts use a sliding scale of analyses to
determine whether the agreement or action violates the law, and
each analysis requires a different level of proof.127 At one end of
effects, such as reduction of output, increase in price, or deterioration in
quality of goods or services .... [C]ourts typically allow proof of the defendant’s
‘market power’ instead. Market power ... is essentially a ‘surrogate for detrimental effects.’”) (quotations omitted).
122 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009). To demonstrate that
burden, the plaintiff’s complaint needs to produce facts that “raise a right to
relief above the speculative level ... [and] enough factual matter (taken as
true) to suggest that an agreement was made.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007).
123 United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 665 (1993) (citing Goldfarb v.
Va. St. Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787–88 (1975)).
124 Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 739–40 (1976) (holding that an unlawful conspiracy to restrain trade and commerce in the furnishing of medical services in Raleigh, North Carolina, substantially impacted
interstate commerce).
125 Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 25 n.42 (citing Ariz. v. Maricopa Med.
Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 348–51 (1982)). See, e.g., Nat’l Gerimedical Hosp. v. Blue
Cross, 452 U.S. 378 (1981); Am. Med. Ass’n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519,
528–29 (1943).
126 To determine what constitutes a concerted action the relevant inquiry
is “whether there is a ‘contract, combination ... , or conspiracy’ amongst ‘separate economic actors pursuing separate economic interests,’ such that the
agreement ‘deprives the marketplace of independent centers of decisionmaking,’ and therefore of ‘diversity of entrepreneurial interests,’ and thus of actual or
potential competition.” Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S.
183, 195 (2010) (citations omitted).
127 Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 780 (1999) (“‘There is always
something of a sliding scale in appraising reasonableness, but the sliding
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the scale, certain types of agreements are considered “per se
unreasonable” if they are proven to nearly always or always
have a “pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue.”128 At the other end, courts most commonly analyze
potentially anticompetitive agreements under the “rule of reason,” which was well described by Justice Brandeis:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is
such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy
competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the
restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint
was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual
or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to
exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. 129

In between those analyses, a court may use the “quick-look”
analysis when an observer with “even a rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude that the arrangements in
question would have an anticompetitive effect on customers and
markets.”130 The type of analysis is an important consideration
in determining whether an in-person prescription requirement
survives § 1 scrutiny.131
IV. FEDERAL ANTITRUST PREEMPTION OF
STATE LAWS AND REGULATIONS
Courts apply a two-stage inquiry in order to decide whether
the Sherman Act preempts a state regulation.132 First, the
scale formula deceptively suggests greater precision than we can hope for ....
Nevertheless, the quality of proof required should vary with the circumstances.’”)
(quoting PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1507, at
402 (1986)).
128 N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
129 Chi. Bd. Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
130 Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 770.
131 See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update
for the 21st Century, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 830 (2009) (finding that
“[p]laintiffs almost never win under the rule of reason” when surveying all
the rule of reason cases between 1999–2009).
132 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, ¶ 221a, at 46.
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Sherman Act preempts a state statute if it “mandates or authorizes conduct that necessarily constitutes a violation of the antitrust laws in all cases, or if it places irresistible pressure on a
private party to violate the antitrust laws in order to comply
with the statute.”133 In other words, a state law is preempted if
that law constitutes a per se violation of § 1.134 If so, then the
statute is preempted unless it is saved under the second inquiry:
the state action doctrine.135 In less obvious cases where the
state’s action doesn’t constitute a per se violation—but could be
perceivably inconsistent with the Sherman Act—the state or
state agency must qualify for the state action doctrine exemption, or else be subject to the restrictions of the Sherman Act.136
A. State Action Doctrine (Parker Immunity)
The state action doctrine was first recognized in the 1943
Supreme Court decision Parker v. Brown, and the doctrine has
become synonymous with the term “Parker immunity.”137 Over
the years, the doctrine has been accepted as a judicially created
exception to federal antitrust laws.138 In simple terms, Parker
immunity is afforded to state or local government actions that
have intentional or foreseeable anticompetitive effects.139 A state
agency only enjoys Parker immunity if it (1) clearly articulates a
Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 661 (1982). In devising the
test, the Court applied similar principles to those used “in considering
whether any state statute is preempted by a federal statute pursuant to the
Supremacy Clause.” Id. at 659.
134 See Matthew McDonald, Note, Antitrust Immunity Up in Smoke:
Preemption, State Action, and the Master Settlement Agreement, 113 COLUM.
L. REV. 97, 98 (2013).
135 See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, ¶ 221a, at 46.
136 See id.
137 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943); Kornmehl, supra note 25, at 6–7.
138 Kornmehl, supra note 25, at 7. Both the Judiciary and Congress have
provided federal antitrust immunity to certain industries through statute and
case law respectively. See, e.g., McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015
(providing the insurance industry is immune to antitrust suits); Fed. Baseball Club v. Nat’l League, 259 U.S. 200, 209 (1922) (deciding to grant Major
League Baseball immunity to antitrust suits).
139 See Kornmehl, supra note 25, at 2–3 (noting that Parker immunity strikes
a balance between the principles of “federalism and state sovereignty”).
133
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policy to displace federal antitrust law; and (2) is actively supervised by public state officials.140
In Parker, the Supreme Court “interpreted the antitrust laws
to confer immunity on anticompetitive conduct by the States when
acting in their sovereign capacity.”141 The plaintiff, a raisin producer and packager, sought to enjoin the state of California from
enforcing a law that established state-run programs to market
agricultural commodities produced within the state, and restricted
competition among the growers by maintaining prices in the
distribution of agricultural commodities.142 The plaintiff argued
that, because 90–95 percent of the raisins grown in California are
ultimately shipped in interstate or foreign commerce,143 the California law was an unlawful contract in restraint of trade among
the several states.144 The Supreme Court upheld the California
law because they interpreted the Sherman Act to prohibit only
“business combinations,” and not the state’s legislative authority.145
Nearly forty years later, in California Retail Liquor Association
v. Midcal Aluminum, the Supreme Court established a two-part
test to determine if a restraint of trade is a policy of the state and
afforded Parker immunity from federal antitrust laws.146 To qualify for immunity, the restraint must be (1) “clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed as state policy” and (2) “actively supervised by the State itself.”147
For the first prong of the Midcal test, the Supreme Court’s
holding in Hallie v. Eau Claire remains the controlling precedent.148 The Court held that in order to pass the “clear articulation” factor, the state legislature need not “expressly state in a
statute or its legislative history that the legislature intends for
the delegated action to have anticompetitive effects” as long as
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, ¶ 217, at 386.
N.C. St. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1110 (2015) (citing Parker, 317 U.S. at 350–51).
142 Parker, 317 U.S. at 344, 346.
143 Id. at 345.
144 Id. at 350.
145 Id. at 351.
146 Cal. Retail Liquor Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980).
147 Id.; AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, ¶ 217, at 386. The test from
that case is often referred to as the “Midcal test.” Id.
148 Hallie v. Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 42–43 (1985).
140
141
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the results of the anticompetitive effect were reasonably foreseeable.149 As of 2015, the Court has not formulated a test to
define the clear articulation factor any further.150
For the second prong of the Midcal test, the Supreme Court
recently adopted a new standard for state agencies to determine
whether they are “actively supervised by the state,” and thus, subject to Parker immunity.151 In N.C. Dental, the Supreme Court
addressed whether an agency empowered by the state to regulate the practice of dentistry could “exclude nondentists from the
market for teeth whitening services in North Carolina.”152 The
Court responded in the negative and ruled that this particular
state agency was a non-sovereign entity controlled by active
market participants that were not actively supervised by the
state.153 The Court further held that any “state board on which a
controlling number of decision makers are active market participants in the occupation the board regulates must satisfy Midcal’s
active supervision requirement.”154
The “active supervision” requirement for state professional
boards is “flexible and context-dependent.”155 A court must determine whether the “[s]tate’s review mechanisms provide ‘realistic assurance’ that a nonsovereign actor’s anticompetitive conduct ‘promotes state policy, rather than merely the party’s
individual interests.’”156 The Court has identified “only a few
constant requirements”157 to determine active supervision:
(1) The supervisor must review the substance of the anticompetitive decision, not merely the procedure followed to produce it;
(2) The supervisor must have the power to veto or modify
particular decisions to ensure they accord with state policy;
Id.
See N.C. St. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1112 (2015)
(noting that the clear articulation factor was “yet still [to] be defined”).
151 Id. at 1121.
152 Id. at 1109.
153 Id. at 1120.
154 Id. at 1114. The Court reasoned that active market participants “will
pursue private interests in restraining trade” and “pose the very risk of selfdealing Midcal’s supervision requirement was created to address.” Id.
155 Id. at 1116.
156 Id. (quoting Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 100–01 (1988)).
157 Id.
149
150
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(3) The mere potential for state supervision is not an adequate
substitute for a decision by the state;
(4) The state supervisor may not itself be an active market
participant.158
The Supreme Court’s articulation of the active supervision
requirement is aimed to reduce the “risks licensing boards dominated by market participants may pose to the free market.” 159
Market participants may “confus[e] their own interests with the
State’s policy goals.”160 The Court likened agencies controlled by
market participants to private trade associations with regulatory
power, which “often have economic incentives to restrain competition ... [that may] have a serious potential to [cause] anticompetitive harm.”161
With these requirements and policies in mind, state medical
boards with a controlling majority of market participants are
likely subject to the active supervision requirement162 and, if not
actively supervised, will not enjoy Parker immunity. It is important to note that, if an actor does not enjoy Parker immunity,
that determination will not ultimately confer liability; it simply
means that an antitrust suit may proceed.163 Whether or not the
antitrust suit would be successful is up to the litigants and the
governing courts.
B. The Impact of N.C. Dental on State Medical Boards
As a result of the N.C. Dental decision, anti-competitive rules
promulgated by state medical boards as they stand will likely not
be afforded Parker immunity. Shortly after the N.C. Dental decision,
commentators expressed interest that the ruling in N.C. Dental
can be expanded to state medical boards if they are proven to be
run by active market participants.164 Scope-of-practice rules are
Id. at 1116–17.
Id. at 1116.
160 Id. at 1114.
161 Id.
162 See infra Part V.B. and accompanying text.
163 See Robert Eisig Bienstock, Municipal Antitrust Liability: Beyond Immunity, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1829, 1837 (1985).
164 Eric M. Fraser, Argument Analysis: Court wary of immunity for licensing boards, but what about doctors?, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 15, 2014), http://www
158
159
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of special importance because the holding in N.C. Dental is directly
applicable to scope-of-practice determinations made by medical
boards.165 The rules that determine under what circumstance a
physician can prescribe a drug are considered scope-of-practice
regulations.166 It follows that those types of rules promulgated by
medical boards composed of a majority of active market participants fall within the holding of N.C. Dental.167
After N.C. Dental, the FTC issued a report for states to guide
them in efforts to insulate their professional boards.168 However,
it is still unclear as to what state mechanisms provide “realistic
assurance” that a state professional board is promoting state
policy.169 As of early 2016, some states have begun to take steps
to insulate their professional boards from the decision, and antitrust attorneys expect all states to enact some kind of legislation
to address the holding in N.C. Dental.170 For example, Connecticut passed a law that adds an active state supervision provision
over actions of licensing boards that operate under the Connecticut
Department of Public Health.171 Oklahoma took a different
.scotusblog.com/2014/10/argument-analysis-court-wary-of-immunity-for-licens
ing-boards-but-what-about-doctors/ [https://perma.cc/96RT-MS6A].
165 See Kathleen Foote, Immune No Longer: State Professional Boards
Consider Their Options, 30 ANTITRUST MAG. 55, 56 (Fall 2015) (on file with
author) (“Scope of practice determinations are the most obvious action to
which NC Dental is applicable .... [B]ecause the Board’s action regarding
teeth whitening was such a determination.”) (quotations omitted).
166 See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text.
167 See supra notes 164–66 and accompanying text.
168 FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC STAFF GUIDANCE ON ACTIVE SUPERVISION OF
STATE REGULATORY BOARDS CONTROLLED BY MARKET PARTICIPANTS (Oct.
2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/competition-policy-guidance
/active_supervision_of_state_boards.pdf [https://perma.cc/75F9-DF7A] [hereinafter FTC GUIDANCE].
169 N.C. St. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1116 (2015).
170 See Foote, supra note 165, at 56 (discussing the various paths that different states have taken to protect the rulemaking ability of their professional
boards); see also Alexandra W. Jabs, Note, North Carolina State Board of
Dental Examiners v. FTC: When Will Enough Active State Supervision Be
Enough, 75 MD. L. REV. ENDNOTES 44, 73 (2016) (highlighting the efforts of
the state of California which created an independent review commission to
satisfy the active supervision requirement).
171 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-14(f) (2015); see also Foote, supra note 165, at
56 n.11.
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route—the governor issued an executive order that requires the
state Attorney General to review all non-rulemaking decisions
by licensing boards.172 It is unclear how courts will react to these
measures.173 The rules promulgated by un-insulated medical
boards dominated by market participants, however, will likely
not enjoy Parker immunity.174
While the FTC issued a guidance document covering what
they view to be sufficient to insulate a state medical board, that
does not necessarily mean that a board will receive Parker immunity.175 It is up to the judiciary to interpret the scope of the
holding in N.C. Dental.176 Moreover, the FTC may or may not
decide to file suit if a medical board follows their guidance.177
However, a private party with standing is not bound by a guidance document and has the option to file suit.178 The following
section highlights a recent case that may open the door for telemedicine companies to challenge anticompetitive state prescription rules, and speculates further challenges.
V. STRATEGIES FOR § 1 CHALLENGES TO STATE
MEDICAL BOARD PRESCRIPTION RULES
A recent case in the U.S. District Court for the Western District
of Texas illustrates that telemedicine companies may succeed in
172 OKLA. EXEC. DEP’T, EXEC. ORDER NO. 2015–33 (2015), http://www.sos
.ok.gov/documents/executive/993.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZC7L-AKSK]; see also
Foote, supra note 165, at 56 n.13.
173 Kathleen Foote, the Senior Assistant Attorney General and Antitrust
Chief in the California Department of Justice, noted that, in response to the
N.C. Dental holding, “there is increasing recognition that it will take litigation—maybe a lot of it—to set the goalposts on the new playing field.” Foote,
supra note 165, at 57.
174 See N.C. Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1110.
175 See FTC GUIDANCE supra note 168 n.* (“The Federal Trade Commission is not bound by this Staff guidance and reserves the right to rescind it at
a later date.”).
176 N.C. Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1123.
177 See supra note 175.
178 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, OPERATING MANUAL CH. 8: INDUSTRY GUIDANCE 2, https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/ftc-administrative
-staff-manuals/ch08industryguidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/J67C-2FT2] (“Unlike a trade regulation rule (TRR) (see OM Ch. 7, ‘Rulemaking’), a guide does
not have the force or effect of law and is not legally binding on the Commission or on the public in an enforcement action.”).
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challenging state rules that require in-person physical examinations for prescriptions under § 1 of the Sherman Act.179 In Teladoc
v. Texas Medical Board, the nation’s largest telehealth provider180
was successful in enjoining the Texas Medical Board from promulgating a new rule that required a “face-to-face examination prior
to prescription of a dangerous drug or controlled substance.”181
The crux of Teladoc’s argument was that the Texas rule would
eliminate Teladoc physicians from providing health care, which
would negatively impact “not just the competitor physicians, but
consumers, [creating] a classic antitrust injury.”182
That court held that, under either a quick-look analysis or
rule of reason analysis, Teladoc’s claim succeeded in proving the
necessary elements for a preliminary injunction.183 Teladoc met
its burden of proving that the Texas rule had an anti-competitive
effect by producing higher premiums and decreased choices.184 In
response, the Texas Medical Board offered a single justification
that the anticompetitive rule would lead to improved quality of
medical care.185 The Teladoc case provides the framework for a
potential lawsuit against rules promulgated by state medical boards
that restrict a physician’s ability to prescribe medications without an in-person examination of the patient. A hypothetical challenge to that type of law is discussed in the following sections.
A. Standing
In any § 1 case, plaintiffs must “prove injury of the type that
the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from
Teladoc, Inc. v. Tex. Med. Bd., 112 F. Supp. 3d 529 (W.D. Tex. 2015).
What is Teladoc?, TELADOC, https://www.teladoc.com/ [https://perma.cc
/3JGC-RS28] (providing that Teladoc is the largest and first telehealth provider in the United States).
181 See Teladoc, 112 F. Supp. 3d at 534 (internal quotation marks omitted).
That case was procedurally unique because the merits of the antitrust issues
were analyzed because the defendant declined to assert the affirmative defense of Parker immunity in the early pleading stages. Id. at 535. This Note,
however, argues that future antitrust challenges would be successful in similar circumstances even if immunity is pleaded by the medical board, because
state medical boards will not likely be afforded Parker immunity.
182 Id. at 536–37.
183 Id. at 537.
184 Id.
185 Id. at 538.
179
180
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that which makes the defendants’ acts unlawful.”186 Telemedicine
companies who provide online doctor consultations are potential
plaintiffs because they are being excluded from the market for
physician services of medication prescriptions. While this Note
focuses on telemedicine companies, there may be additional potential plaintiffs. Prescription medication consumers are harmed
because they are directly affected by the higher prices of in-person
visits, thus they could possibly bring a suit seeking redress.187
Additionally the FTC could file suit because they have jurisdiction over antitrust suits concerning “professional services” within
the health care industry.188
B. Pleading Challenges and Proving a Prima Facie Case
Potential plaintiffs will bear the burden of production to establish a prima facie case that the rule resulted in anti-competitive
effects.189 A plaintiff will have to prove that a defendant state
medical board possesses market power, or that the rule creates
(1) increased prices for physicians’ services for prescriptions; (2) decreased output in the market for physicians’ services for prescriptions; or (3) reduced quality of medical care.190 As evidenced by
the Teladoc lawsuit, state rules that prohibit physicians from
prescribing medication without an in-person examination of the
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 492 U.S. 489 (1977).
See Teladoc, 112 F. Supp. 3d at 537 (Elimination of physicians providing healthcare would thus negatively impact .... consumers, a classic antitrust injury.”). Thus, any person seeking a prescription may have a viable
cause of action.
188 Although the FTC and Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) both have jurisdiction to enforce federal antitrust law,
both agencies have agreed to separately pursue certain industries and practices. See FED. TRADE COMM’N & ANTITRUST DIV. U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE FED. TRADE COMM’N AND THE ANTITRUST
DIV. OF THE U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CONCERNING CLEARANCE PROCEDURES FOR
INVESTIGATIONS 8 (Mar. 2002), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr
/legacy/2007/07/17/10170.pdf [https://perma.cc/RS4B-V8YS]. The FTC has jurisdiction over antitrust suits concerning professional services within the health
care industry. See id.
189 PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, ¶ 1504b, at
358 (2d ed. 2003).
190 See supra notes 119–21 and accompanying text.
186
187

2016]

MORE THAN JUST A TOOTHACHE?

205

patient likely increase overall costs for physician services.191 Potential plaintiffs will have to provide evidence that online doctor
services are cheaper than regular physician visits.192 Moreover,
those rules are likely to reduce output of physician services.193
To sustain their burden, plaintiffs will have to provide evidence,
likely in the form of affidavits or research studies, that physicians who conduct online visits with patients treat more patients
than without those services.194 Lastly, it will be difficult for a
plaintiff to prove that online doctor services result in increased
quality of care.195
To prevent scrutiny under § 1, a state medical board will have
to assert Parker immunity and must prove that they (1) manifested a clearly articulated policy to displace federal antitrust law
and (2) are actively supervised by public state officials.196 It is
likely that the clear articulation element is met because it is reasonably foreseeable that a law requiring an in-person examination
of a patient for prescriptions would be anticompetitive and exclude
online services from the market of prescription services.197 Prescription drugs can only be prescribed by certain qualified people
(such as physicians).198 Thus, they are inherently anticompetitive
because they exclude other people from the prescribing market.
Teladoc, 112 F. Supp. 3d at 537 (finding that Teladoc submitted evidence that their remote doctor consultations typically cost $40, whereas the
average cost to the physician or emergency room was $145 or $1957 respectively). Thus, restricting Teladoc’s telemedicine services would result in increased prices. Id.
192 Id.
193 Id. (stating Teladoc submitted physician affidavits declaring that their
remote doctor consulting services allowed certain doctors to treat more patients).
194 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 189, ¶ 1504b at 358.
195 Plaintiffs will need to introduce evidence that online doctor visits increase the quality of health care services and are superior in that regard to
in-person visits. Although online visits have advantages, no identifiable credible information supports the proposition that they increase the quality of
health care services.
196 See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
197 See N.C. St. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1112 (2015)
(“[A] policy may satisfy this test yet still to be defined at so high level of generality as to leave open critical questions about how and to what extent the
market should be regulated.”).
198 See 21 U.S.C. § 353(b) (2015).
191
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The active supervision element, however, will be highly factdependent and require litigators to test their skills.199 The best
litigation route for a plaintiff would be to frame their argument
against active supervision by using the factors identified by the
Supreme Court in N.C. Dental.200
C. Per Se Analysis
In any § 1 challenge to an anticompetitive practice, a court
must decide which analysis should govern the case.201 It is unlikely that a per se analysis would be used in potential challenges
to state prescription rules, because courts are generally hesitant
to apply a per se analysis to rules adopted by professional associations.202 It is not impossible, however, for a court to apply a
per se analysis to a defendant in the health care industry.203
A potential plaintiff would benefit from this analysis because
it is the most plaintiff-friendly.204 The most plausible argument
to make would be that rules requiring in-person physical examinations constitute horizontal price fixing.205 That type of rule may
See N.C. St. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1116–17
(2015) (providing a vague set of factors to determine what actions constitute
“active supervision”).
200 See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
201 See supra notes 127–31 and accompanying text.
202 See FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458 (1986) (“We have
been slow to condemn rules adopted by professional associations as unreasonable per se”); Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,
695 (1978) (holding that an engineering society’s ethical canon that prohibited
competitive bidding was analyzed under the rule of reason, not under the per
se analysis).
203 Ariz. v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 335–36 (1982) (applying the per se rule to a group of competing physicians who set maximum fees
they could claim in payment for health services provided to policyholders of
certain insurance plans).
204 See Thomas B. Leary, Paper, A Structured Outline for the Analysis of
Horizontal Agreements, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Mar. 3–4, 2004), https://www.ftc
.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/structured-outline-analysis
-horizontal-agreements/chairsshowcasetalk.pdf [https://perma.cc/MUB9-ZX93]
(“Experienced antitrust counselors recognize that the method of analysis is
often outcome-determinative; plaintiffs tend to win per se cases and defendants
tend to win rule-of-reason cases.”).
205 Courts differentiate between two types of restraints: horizontal and
vertical. A horizontal restraint is “an agreement between competitors at the
199
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be considered a concerted action to maintain the price of physician
services for medication prescriptions at the current level required
by in-person hospital visits, whereas online doctor visits would
greatly reduce that amount if they were allowed to compete in
the market.206 Thus, there is an agreement between competitors
(physicians) at the same level of the market structure to keep
doctor visit costs high, constituting horizontal price fixing.207
However, a court would likely reject this argument because a
potential defendant could raise the procompetitive justifications
of either (1) increased quality of care or (2) drug abuse and injury
prevention. The medical board would need to offer evidence which
demonstrates that either of those two justifications would result in
market efficiencies, thus precluding the use of the per se analysis.208
The first justification, increased quality of care, would likely
be hard to prove or impossible to categorize as a justification,
because public safety is generally not considered a redeeming
cognizable justification in Sherman Act cases.209 In the Teladoc
case, the state medical board offered that same procompetitive
same level of the market structure,” while a vertical restraint refers to “combinations of persons at different levels of the market structure.” United States v.
Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972). Horizontal price fixing is typically
considered per se unreasonable. See FTC v. Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n,
493 U.S. 411, 436 n.19 (1990) (“[H]orizontal price-fixing ... has been considered a per se violation for many decades.”). But horizontal price fixing is not
always considered per se unreasonable, especially if an industry requires
horizontal restraints to produce the product at all. See NCAA v. Bd. Regents
Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100–01 (1984) (refusing to apply a per se analysis
to horizontal price fixing on college football television contracts because the
live college football industry required horizontal restraints in order to produce the product of live college football).
206 See supra notes 50–53.
207 See supra note 205.
208 Once the defendant identifies a procompetitive justification, also called
a “redeeming virtue,” then the per se rule is inapplicable because it only applies to agreements that have a “pernicious effect” on competition and “lack of
any redeeming virtue.” N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)
(emphasis added).
209 See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692
(1978) (“[T]he purpose of the analysis is to form a judgment about the competitive significance of the restraint; it is not to decide whether a policy favoring competition is in the public interest, or in the interest of the members of
an industry.”).
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justification.210 However, the court cited a string of Supreme Court
decisions and held that public safety is not a sufficient justification in § 1 cases.211 Thus, any public safety justification, including improved quality of medical care, will likely not be sufficient
as a procompetitive justification.
The second justification of injury and drug abuse is compelling because some prescription drugs, such as opioid pain relievers (OPRs) and other narcotics, are dangerous drugs212 that need
to be regulated tightly.213 OPRs are highly addictive and commonly
abused; examples include oxycodone, hydrocodone, and methadone.214 According to the CDC, three-quarters of prescription drug
overdose deaths in 2011 were attributed to OPRs.215 A recent study
demonstrates that OPR abuse has a serious economic strain on
the health care industry, due to the excess medical costs associated with substance abuse treatment programs, prevention programs, and research.216 In total, annual health care costs of OPR
abuse accounted for approximately 55.7 billion dollars in the United
States.217 Thus, it is conceivable that there could be cost savings
associated with rules that require an in-person examination.
Teladoc, Inc. v. Tex. Med. Bd., 112 F. Supp. 3d 529, 538 (2015) (“The
sole justification the [Texas Medical Board] offers is that the New Rule 190.8
will lead to improved quality of medical care.”).
211 Id. at 540 (citing Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 695; FTC v.
Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 463 (1986)).
212 There is ample evidence that those drugs are more commonly abused
and, consequently, more dangerous than other prescription drugs. See CDC
STUDY, supra note 17, at 1; Howard G. Birnbaum, et al., Societal Costs of
Prescription Opioid Abuse, Dependence, and Misuse in the United States, 12
PAIN MED. 657, 657 (2011), http://painmedicine.oxfordjournals.org/content
/painmedicine/12/4/657.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/MSW2-W57Q].
213 Several federal agencies regulate OPRs. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is the lead federal agency that deals with controlled substances and narcotics. Drug Enforcement Administration, FED. REG., https://
www.federalregister.gov/agencies/drug-enforcement-administration [https://
perma.cc/L855-LQXQ]. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is also
beginning to explore and assess new policies to further regulate OPRs. See
Califf, FDA top officials call for sweeping review of agency opioid policies,
FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. (Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/News
room/PressAnnouncements/ucm484765.htm [https://perma.cc/2TWS-RWVE].
214 See CDC STUDY, supra note 17, at 1.
215 Id.
216 See Birnbaum, supra note 212, at 660.
217 Id. at 661.
210
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Injury and drug abuse is a compelling justification, and the
per se analysis will likely not apply because the Supreme Court
only applies the “demanding” per se rule in obvious cases.218
Once the defendant introduces some justification for the anticompetitive conduct, the court will not use a per se analysis.219 If
the argument for a per se analysis fails, then a court will look at
the case under a quick-look or rule of reason analysis.
D. Quick-Look Analysis
Potential plaintiffs could argue that a court should apply a
quick-look analysis.220 A court will use the quick-look analysis
when “an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of
economics could conclude that the arrangements in question would
have an anticompetitive effect on customers and markets.”221
The burden-shifting framework of the quick-look analysis involves several steps. First, the court determines if the restraint
is “inherently suspect.”222 Second, if the restraint is inherently
suspect, then the defendant is charged with the burden of articulating a “legally cognizable competitive justification.”223 Third,
the plaintiff has to address that justification, which they can
easily do by either (a) simply showing the restraint harmed consumers (without having to adduce evidence), or (b) demonstrating
that the restraint had likely anticompetitive effects.224 Fourth, the
See Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 (1977).
[A] per se rule is confined to restraints that would always or
almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output. Thus, a per se rule is appropriate only after courts have
had considerable experience with the type of restraint at issue, .... and only if they can predict with confidence that the
restraint would be invalidated in all or almost all instances
under the rule of reason.
Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 877–78
(2007) (internal citation omitted).
219 See supra note 208.
220 In their challenge to the Texas Medical Board, plaintiff Teladoc argued
for a quick-look analysis. Teladoc, Inc. v. Tex. Med. Bd., 112 F. Supp. 3d 529,
536–37 (2015).
221 Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999).
222 Polygram Holdings, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 35–36 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
223 Id. at 36 (parentheses omitted).
224 Id.
218
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hefty evidentiary burden switches to the defendant to show that
the restraint did not harm consumers or the procompetitive justification outweighs the effects on consumers.225
A court could apply the quick-look analysis, as they did with
the agreement in National Society of Professional Engineers v.
United States, where the Supreme Court held that a professional
association’s agreement was not price fixing, but appeared to be
so similar that “no elaborate industry analysis [was] required to
demonstrate the anticompetitive character of such an agreement.”226 However, it is unclear if a court will deem an in-person
prescription rule as inherently suspect, because this area of antitrust litigation is novel and the legal standard behind the quicklook analysis is cloudy and rarely applied.227 The defense attorneys’
resources and the availability of reliable evidence would likely
determine whether quick-look analysis is used.
E. Rule of Reason Analysis
Under a rule of reason analysis, a potential plaintiff would
incur a costly legal battle.228 A plaintiff’s success under the rule
of reason is possible,229 but will most likely not occur.230 The rule
of reason is the preferred standard for § 1 cases, requiring the judge
to weigh the harms and benefits of the anticompetitive act.231 To
establish a prima facie case, plaintiffs would have to allege the
defendant medical board possessed sufficient market power or
Id.
435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
227 Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42
U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 1375, 1413 (2009) (“Not surprisingly, the quick-look standard
is rarely applied and has fallen into disuse in actually resolving cases.”).
228 See id. at 1460–66 (noting that a rule of reason case is costlier than a
per se case due to the extensive scope of discovery necessitating huge litigation teams).
229 See, e.g., Teladoc, 112 F. Supp. 3d 529, 536–37 (2015) (holding that
Teladoc’s § 1 claims succeeded under both the quick-look and Rule of Reason
analyses).
230 See Carrier, supra note 131, at 830.
231 See supra note 127. Perhaps “[c]ontrary to its name, the Rule [of Reason] does not open the field of antitrust inquiry to any argument in favor of a
challenged restraint that may fall within the realm of reason. Instead, it
focuses directly on the challenged restraint’s impact on competitive conditions.” Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978).
225
226
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the rule in contention resulted in increased prices, lower output,
or lower quality of care for the product of physicians’ services.232
A plaintiff’s easiest method would be to prove that the state
medical board’s rulemaking abilities confer total control over the
physician’s services market in a given state. To do so, a plaintiff
would have to define the relevant market, which includes (1) the
relevant geographic market and (2) the relevant product market.233 In any potential case, the relevant geographic market is
defined as the state where the rule was in effect.234 The relevant
product market would be physician services because telemedicine physicians compete with urgent care physicians, hospitalbased physicians, and private physicians.235
Alternatively, a possibly more difficult route for a plaintiff
would be to prove that the contested rule resulted in higher prices,
lower output, or reduced quality of care for physicians’ services.236
This claim would be difficult to assess because a potential plaintiff would need statistical evidence about online doctor services
in that particular market before the rule was adopted, or possibly use evidence from other jurisdictions where it is available.
If the plaintiff introduces a prima facie case, a defendant
could rebut by producing evidence that the rule creates benefits
that outweigh the harms produced by the plaintiff’s case.237 As
stated earlier, the defendant’s best option would be to prove the rule
aims to reduce drug abuse and promote injury prevention, thereby
reducing medical costs associated with those problems.238
Even if a court was willing to accept that justification in defense of a state prescription rule, the plaintiff would still have
the opportunity to prove that the alleged benefits of the rule are
not necessary to achieve its goals.239 That inquiry has two parts:
See supra note 119.
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 189, ¶ 1503, at 348.
234 See, e.g., Amended Complaint at ¶ 43, Teladoc v. Tex. Med. Bd., 112 F.
Supp. 3d 529 (2015) (No. 1:15-cv-00343-RP), 2015 WL 487362 (pleading the
relevant geographic market as the state where the rule was in effect).
235 See, e.g., id. ¶ 42(b) (pleading the relevant product market as physician
services).
236 See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
237 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 189, ¶ 1504b, at 358.
238 See supra notes 212–18 and accompanying text.
239 The rule of reason’s last step “involves determining whether the challenged agreement is necessary to achieve its purported goals.” United States
232
233
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(1) whether the restraint actually promotes the legitimate interests; and (2) whether that restraint can be pursued in a manner
to restrain competition less.240
If the in-person prescription rules are promulgated to reduce
drug abuse and injury prevention, then that justification is likely a
legitimate interest under the state’s police power authority.241
However, it is possible that the rule could be viewed as overly
restrictive if it forbids all prescriptions resulting from an online
consultation. A less restrictive rule could, in effect, place a physical examination requirement on only truly dangerous prescriptions. A less restrictive law could require physical examinations
for only OPRs,242 and allow for online consultations for other
prescriptions. This type of law would, in effect, be a less restrictive method for a state to enforce physical examination rules if
those rules were adopted to prevent injury and drug abuse.
CONCLUSION
Telecommunication technologies and patient-care models
have advanced to the point where online doctor services provide
a cost effective method of health care. Although some medical
professionals may advocate against online consultation services
for prescription drugs in favor of the old system of in-person
visits, a dogmatic reliance on the traditional health care delivery
system will not stand up to a § 1 challenge unless proven to promote an efficient market. The Sherman Act, like the common
law, “evolves to meet the dynamics of present economic conditions.”243 Although online doctor visits are a novel form of medical
care, they should not be ignored. Online doctor visits have promising benefits for competition and health outcomes because they
are cheaper than in-person visits, easier to schedule, and reduce
travel times.244 Telemedicine companies have standing to sue
state medical boards over rules that require in-person physical
v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 678 (1993); AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note
189, ¶ 1505, at 370.
240 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 189, ¶ 1505, at 370.
241 See supra notes 86–92 and accompanying text.
242 See supra note 212.
243 Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 879 (2007).
244 See supra Part I.A.
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examinations and should strongly consider taking that action if
it would allow them to expand their services. Although state level
legislation requiring more active supervision could affect the
antitrust analysis, legislative change is often slow to develop.
Furthermore, it is questionable if states will adopt a truly active
model of supervision, the definition of which is amorphous and
currently undefined. The possibilities of this form of “impact
litigation” in the health care field could be advantageous to providers, consumers, and the market at large.

